This is bad, very bad

The assassination of Benazir is probably one of the worst things that could have happened to Pakistan which now stands at the abyss. I have been watching the developments of the last few weeks with some optimism. It seemed clear that the army had realized that the jihadis had become a threat to their power. It was clear that the feudals, represented by the political parties, also saw the threat. The only rational response was a compromise between the army and the feudals with the army giving up some of their power and the mechanism for achieving the compromise was through elections. And, there was hope that in the process of compromise some of the power would devolve to the people of Pakistan. There was hope for some glimmers of democracy. Unlike many in the media I did not think the elections would be rigged - there was simply too much at stake. And given the lay of the land, it was clear that Benazir would win, if not an overwhelming majority, at least sufficient seats to form a reasonably stable government. Nawaz Sharif et al. were a sideshow. She was the linchpin. Without her it is not clear what is going to happen.

To understand what she meant in the Pakistani scheme it is important to realize that she was not just the leader of the most popular of the political parties - she was her father's daughter. And her father occupies an almost unique position in Pakistan's political history. Political parties in Pakistan represent what used to be, and still mostly is, the feudal class. Various scions of landowning families (sometimes turned industrialists) like the Sharifs hold power and wield it for their own narrow interests. Zulifiqar Ali Bhutto was an exception of sorts. He was also from the feudal families but he actually tried to break the power of the feudals. Ironically, this most undemocratic of individuals (he had a habit of throwing people who displeased him into prison) tried to bring some democracy to the country. He failed but he is remembered fondly by many in the Pakistani public for the attempt. Some of that fondness has always stuck to Benazir. And to give her her due, in spite of the corruption of her rule, during her time in office she did make some attempts at democratization. More important than anything she did she was a symbol that the masses of the people actually had a stake in the political process. That there was a hope that some day the people, not just the feudals and the army, would have a say in their own lives. Without her there is no one of national stature who can provide that hope.

The feudals and the army can make all the compromises they want. If the masses of people finally lose all hope - that way lies Chaos. No people deserve that. This is a dark day for Pakistan, and those who care for her.

The next phase in Pakistan

And so it begins. It seems the dance is over. The military and the politicos have each tested the waters and each other, discovered their strengths, and been shown their weaknesses. All that remains is the consummation which will take place in the form of elections. The people who could have complicated the bargaining have been released now that the bargaining is over. To sour Bhutto's game a bit Sharif has been permitted to return. There is the usual talk of boycott, but those threats are almost routine. Bhutto is already backing off from an earlier statement of support. So now with their backs covered, the military is finally making its move against the Jihadis. The regular army is now fighting the Jihadis in Swat which is probably the first time since Hashtnagar that the military is (militarily) fighting its own citizens. The next few weeks will be crucial as they will show (a) whether the Pakistani military is capable of this kind of campaign, and (b) if the public will accept the civilian casualties which are bound to mount as the campaign progresses. It is for the sake of the latter that the military needed the accommodation with the politicos. The press may be free in Pakistan in the sense of being able to present anti-government views, but as in the US it can be "influenced" quite heavily by the establishment.

Let's try to say it again.

I posted this over in comments at the American Footprints website. It is slightly less rambling then my post below so I thought I would put it up here as well.

The only time I recall the Pakistan military easing out one of their own from the top post was when Yahya was removed from office after losing half the country. Kayani is well respected but he is only one of nine corp commanders. All of them have been groomed and brought to their current state of prominence by Musharraf. I think it will take much more than US patience running out for a majority of the corp commanders to move against Musharraf. One scenario would be a nationwide uprising against Musharraf. In which case as you point out the army would not want to be in the position of putting down its own people. But, unless the economic situation turns dire I really don't see that happening. There is no organized institution in Pakistan that could lead such an uprising. The availability of multiple sources of information - a relatively free written press, independent TV channels etc. allow for a bottom up mobilization but even for that there has to be a prize after the struggle. If the prize is another kleptocratic government lead by Benazir or Nawaz Sharif or some combination I think the chances of an uprising are very slim.

On the other hand the military needs the political parties badly right now. The jihadi challenge is very real. Fazlullah's challenge in Swat and the Lal Masjid uprising are deadly serious. And the power they are challenging is that of the military. Musharraf's attempt to reach an understanding may have been helped along by the US and UK but even without them Musharraf would have gone this route. The military needs the backing of the only other power center in the country which is represented by the political parties so that they can focus on what will be a bloody and not entirely popular fight. And Bhutto represents the largest faction by far. If not support from the political parties the military at the very least need their acquiescence. So that when the inevitable "collateral damage" takes place the parties don't use them to mobilize the populace against the military. And so that the fight can be portrayed in the "proper" manner. The powers represented by the political parties also need the jihadi challenge to be met. The jihadis are not your daddy's islamists like the old jamaat'e islami who look positively moderate nowadays. These guys are, to use a scholarly term, nuts, and their ascendance is going to be horrible for all established groups. And the only group that can meet their immediate challenge is the army - and not a demoralized army. So the political parties need a compromise right now as well - not a victory.

What we are seeing is the dance of the incompetents.

And so it goes

It would be funny to watch the dance of the incompetents now taking place in Pakistan if it was not so depressing. There are not too many options available. The jihadis have moved into the Swat valley and and have been able to hold out against the military. To move against them in force requires that the power centers of the military and the political parties present a united front. The obvious way to do this is through power sharing between Bhutto and Musharraf. The fact that Bhutto is corrupt and venal and Musharraf seems a caricature who does not have any discernible strategy and some difficulty keeping his word is neither here nor there. They represent the power centers which are both threatened by the jihadi challenge and who will both suffer if the challenge is not answered. And unfortunately neither is dispensable. Bhutto leads a party that does not have any mechanism for challenging her leadership. And the military cannot afford to have Musharraf humiliated. I am sure at least some in the military must be furiously trying to come up with some way of removing him without losing face but I don't see what that would be. It is not as if they both don't realize they need the other. While Musharraf put real threats like Hamid Gul in solitary confinement Benazir was allowed to stay in the comfort of her own home - sallying out from time to time to make heroic speeches. On her part Bhutto, at least initially, kept her criticism of Musharraf relatively indirect - blaming those around him rather than him directly. But instead of coming to an agreement and moving on they keep stumbling around while the jihadis consolidate their power and the people who will in the end pay with their blood and treasure for the fight against the jihadis lget more and more disgusted. The support that these two are bleeding away will not easily come back, and it is a support that will be badly needed in the days to come.

Whither Pakistan (moved)

(This post had been sitting in draft for a while so when I finally published it, it appeared way down on the blog. I don't know how to move it so I am cheating and republishing it)

I had originally intended to write this the new media way - chock full of links to corroborating sources. But it has been sitting in draft for so long that I am afraid that by the time I do that Pakistan will have already gone wherever it is going. With the recent imposition of Martial law I suppose I should update this post. But I am too lazy to do it and I don't think my fundamental take has changed. And anyway I don't think either of the two people who read the intermittent outputs of this blog will mind. To any third person who might wander and actually suffer through this in I hope you will excuse the rambling sloppy nature of my writing.

A common misconception is that democracy empowers people. In truth, empowerment is not a result of democracy, democracy is the reflection of empowerment. Governments reflect power balances in society, and if people either collectively or individually have power this is generally reflected in some form of democracy. The reflection of power in the form of democracy is best illustrated by that oldest (with apologies to Iceland) of democracies, Britain. In Britain from 1780 when less than 3% of the population could vote to universal suffrage in 1918 the power of the vote closely followed economic power. From the rule under Henry VI that in order to vote you had to possess land worth 40 shillings to 1884 when to vote you had to be a male house owner the right to vote was explicitly tied to economic power. And what does that have to do with Pakistan and its future? This, that when we talk about democracy in Pakistan we should not confuse it with democracy in Sweden. Or if we do it should be in terms of understanding that just as in Sweden democracy reflects the power balance so in Pakistan will democracy reflect the power balance. Just that in Sweden the average voter due to their economic clout may actually possess some power while in Pakistan, for the same reason, the average voter will possess very little. The political structure will reflect the accommodations and conflicts of the power centers in the country.

Power exists in a number of different ways. The two principal ways are through the ownership of resources, and through organization. Labor unions may not own resources but if they are well organized they can exert power. And it is clear that ownership of resources - money, land, - usually goes hand in hand with power. In Pakistan there have been two groups that have had power through most of its history, the moneyed classes (feudal landlords and "industrialists") through their ownership of resources and the military through its organization.

Things seemed to be changing in the late 60's as a newly emerging middle class in the cities distinct from the landlords started demanding a share of the power. Actual political parties with actual mass participation began to appear. One of them was the Pakistan Peoples Party led by Bhutto the father of Benazir and very much a member of the power elite. Despite his wealthy (very wealthy) background Bhutto actually was a real honest to goodness populist politician, and was soon immensely popular in what was then West Pakistan. He campaigned under the slogan "Islam is our faith, democracy is our policy, socialism is our economy. All power to the people." After he came to power he, more or less, tried to keep his promises, and embarked on a policy of economic redistribution involving nationalization of industrial sectors and banks. He set up a policy of low interest loans to farmers and small business and there was a push to increase exports. One can argue over the long term viability of his economic policies but at least initially they led to an increase in the size of the middle class.

A bit off the subject but relevant nonetheless, in the late sixties in Pakistan there was also a developing (reviving?) communist movement which had come into its own after a split with the Soviets after the 1965 war with India. I hesitate to call them Maoist because that label brings to mind the Naxalites in India and the Shining Path in Peru and perhaps the PKK in Turkey. These guys were Maoist in the sense that they believed that the peasants were the vanguard of the "revolution." They had some success in the NWFP, actually setting up a liberated zone in an area called Hashtnagar in the early seventies. The army tried to break them but, in a scenario repeated lately in Waziristan, were not able to quell them and a de-facto "liberated zone" existed for quite a while (I am not sure about its status now). After Bhutto took power the communist advance was stopped cold. Wherever the communists had succeeded in getting the peasantry organized a government minister would show up and sign over land deeds to them. End of revolution. Bhutto used to boast that during his tenure he had not killed a single communist and they had not gained an inch.

Bhutto had the misfortune of ruling during a period of global inflation. As the price of food went up so did the temperature of the populace. Also there was the matter of the nuclear program which did not endear him to the US. And then, in what seems to have been a favorite activity of all megalomaniacal leaders, Bhutto engaged in vote rigging to guarantee an election he would most likely have won anyway (shades of CREEP) and lost more popular support. With the tacit approval of the US the military took power and thus began the long dark period of Zia. I don't know how long Zia would have lasted. The increase in the size of the middle class had resulted in a demand for more power from the people and the military in Pakistan, unlike the military in say Burma, is not separate from the people. In time, it was possible that there would have been a movement towards democracy.

But it was not to be. Fortune smiled on Zia, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and Brezinski saw an opportunity to bleed the Soviets. Money poured into Pakistan from the US directly and through Saudi Arabia. The drug lords of Afghanistan moved to Pakistan and drug money (along with drugs) also appeared in large amounts, bringing a phenomenal rise in drug addiction and an increase in corruption. Much of this money was funneled to religious groups which were best positioned to recruit the fodder required for the bleeding of the Soviets. And thus arose a third power center in Pakistan, what for the want of a better word we will call the jihadis. Initially they were under the control of the military, and the military made use of them in a number of different ways. The fodder went to fight and die in Afghanistan. The money also went to empower the military resulting in a vast expansion of military owned businesses. And the money benefitted and enhanced the power of those in the military most closely tied to the bleeding operation giving them an added incentive to keeping the jihadi operations alive. After the Soviets folded the military used the jihadis to acquire "strategic depth" in Afghanistan by training and backing the Taliban. In Kashmir the military tried to use the Brezinski strategy against India. However, it was becoming clear by the end of the millenium that the jihadis were on their way to becoming a power center in their own right. In 1999 in the seesaw between the two established power centers the military again took power in the person of Musharraf. Early in his tenure Musharraf had recognized the problem posed by the Jihadis but was thrashing about for a solution.

And then came 9/11 and the supposed U turn of the Musharraf regime. At first glance it seems that this was the perfect opportunity to get rid of the jihadi problem. And so Musharraf seems to have thought. With 9/11 a true shock to the conscience the support for jihadis from the non-militant religious segment of the population had been dealt a severe blow. The US was providing financial support which used properly could cut the ground out from under the jihadis in their centers of power. I have written earlier about one Musharraf attempt to do so which foundered on the rock of the arrogant stupidity of a Republican congressional staffer. Another was informal discussions between the military and groups in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas to regularize the status of FATA - treating them like any other part of Pakistan and including them in the distribution of resources. Whatever the wisdom of these actions and whoever is to blame for thwarting them they were not successful in eliminating the Jihadi power. This year the Jihadis felt comfortable enough in their power to openly challenge the government - first in Swat and parts of NWFP and finally in the capital Islamabad itself. At the same time the old enemy inflation was increasing the frustration level of the populace. Economic development has increased the rich poor divide. Some of this frustration was vented in the Chief Justice incident.

Which brings us to today. The military has provided reasonably efficient government for a while. But the economic development has not been enough to get them strong support and in any case it has been uneven, increasing the rich/poor divide. If the military is to win against the jihadi challenge they need allies. And the only available allies are the wealthy and the political parties which represent them. Among them the PPP is the most reasonable choice. Its leader is one with whom Musharraf does not have a personal vendetta. It is reasonably popular and would provide the legitimacy the military needs to operate in todays globalized information society. The next step will probably be an agreement between the military and the PPP where the PPP, after winning the parliamentary elections leads the country into "democracy" while preserving the perquisites of the military. The military then settles down to the task of getting rid of the jihadis. Whether they will succeed will depend on how well the PPP can govern and whether they can provide some measure of economic and social relief to the populace and whether the military can subdue the jihadis without arousing nationalist sentiments in the NWFP and Baluchistan. In order to keep the public on its side the Military-PPP alliance will have to do something to alleviate the economic stress on the people. Rising inflation in Pakistan will severely hamper their efforts. In the best of worlds improving the economic condition of the people will lead to conditions where with more economic clout the people of Pakistan will be able to demand and get a voice in their governance - democracy as we know it. In the real world such a transformation requires leadership of a caliber that I don't see in Pakistan today. So the prospects are not that great.

On the international front one of Musharraf's contributions has been a gradual de-emphasis on the Kashmir issue. If this emotionally charged issue is taken off the table then given the globalization trends one would normally expect a gradual normalization and increasing trade with India. However, there is an axis developing with India and US on one side and China and Russia on the other. If Pakistan tilts towards China which has been close to Pakistan through fair times and foul it is not clear how far normalization can go.

They say trying times call out great leaders. They are clearly wrong. In these trying times when the future of the planet itself (in terms of its human population) is in jeopardy we have Bush. And Pakistan has Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto. But we go through history with the leaders we have not the leaders we want.

Musharraf's speech

Musharraf's speech today announcing the state of emergency was interesting. Unlike most speeches on occasions of this nature it was not just flag waving and martial music. Musharraf tried to make a case for his action and he was actually trying quite hard to convince the audience. He realizes his future is on a knife's edge and the reaction of the public in the next few days will literally be a question of life or death for him. His argument basically was that the rule of law had broken down and he had to take action. For the breakdown of the rule of law he blamed first the extremists who he said were trying to shove an alien version of Islam down people's throats. Second perversely he blamed the supreme court which he said had become so intrusive that the government had become paralyzed. He referred to the more than a hundred suo moto cases brought forward by the supreme court. As I understand it a suo moto case is where the supreme court independently without someone bringing a case to the court takes up a particular issue and orders investigations and decrees remedies. That seems a bit strange to me because it seems to provide the supreme court with an inordinate amount of power with no checks. (When I google suo moto I get a definition and then a lot of links to the supreme court actions in Pakistan, so maybe it is an idiosyncrasy of the Pakistani legal system). Musharraf's argument was that the Supreme court's intrusion into executive function had upset the balance between the branches of government, paralyzed the executive and severely hampered law enforcement activities thus promoting lawlessness. He also mentioned that the Supreme court had still not ruled on the legality of his election while pursuing cases that it itself creates. All this he said had lead to an atmosphere of uncertainty which was effecting the economic health of the country. He claimed that after seven years of growth the economy was showing signs of stalling as investors stayed away because of the uncertainty. The emergency he said was a minimalist emergency. None of the governments, provincial and federal would be dissolved and the transition to full fledged democracy would continue.

All in all it was a surprisingly effective speech. There was no soaring rhetoric, not much god and country. Rather it was presented as the complaints of a man trying to do his job and being frustrated by officious busybodies. The question is whether the people of Pakistan will buy it. If they do he has bought himself a few more months to handle the jihadi problem. If not I am sure the military will find someone else.

Why we invaded Iraq

Reading through the various analyses about Iraq at times there seems to be a genuine puzzlement about the reasons for going into Iraq. Which is puzzling. It seems rather clear if we look at what is "working" in Iraq as opposed to what is not. Most people are not dumb, just lazy. So, the scale of the "disaster" in Iraq has never made sense if you assume that we went in for democracy promotion. Could the Bush administration be so incredibly dumb about something they feel so passionately about? After all. the desire to invade Iraq is an old one - plenty of time for planning all kinds of eventualities. So why was there no post-invasion planning? Why no planning for reconstruction? Why the allocation of important jobs to family members of neocons? Two (not mutually exclusive) answers come to mind. First is the one that is the common refrain. The Bush administration is staffed by incompetents. The second is that there was post-war planning. But only for the important stuff. If we restrict our attention to administration luminaries like Paul Wolfovitz and Doug Feith the first argument seems the most reasonable. However, the administration has been relatively competent about things it considers important - like tax cuts. And even in foreign policy it has been relatively competent in the sense that it has been generally successful in getting its way. Whether it was the overthrow of the Islamic Courts in Somalia or the sanctions against Iran. Not that it has always been successful or that its foreign policy decisions have been wise (in my opinion they have not) but if you consider things from their point of view things have generally gone the way they have wanted. Which brings us to the second answer - that the administration did plan for what it considered was most important.

If you look at what is going on in Iraq from the US point of view the big "success" story has been the building of the permanent enduring contingency operating bases including Tallil (formerly Camp Adder), Balad (formerly Camp Anaconda) and al-Asad. Everything I have read says these are marvels of engineering - small American cities plonked down in the middle of the desert. Competent planning indeed. However, as Tom Engelhardt says in this Salon article :

While much space in our papers has, of late, been devoted to the administration's lack of postwar planning, next to no interest has been shown in the planning that did take place.

Not that there has not been any news about the bases. Engelhardt among others has been highlighting these bases over and over again. Globalsecurity.org has a decent sized list of the bases. Even before the war people were pointing out that the PNAC had called for permanent US bases in the Middle East to preserve US global hegemony long before The War Against Terror. For example, here is an article by Jay Bookman in the Atlanta Constitution dated September 29, 2002, entitled "The President's Real Goal in Iraq" in which he describes the September 2000 PNAC report.

To preserve the Pax Americana, the report says U.S. forces will be required to perform "constabulary duties" -- the United States acting as policeman of the world -- and says that such actions "demand American political leadership rather than that of the United Nations."

To meet those responsibilities, and to ensure that no country dares to challenge the United States, the report advocates a much larger military presence spread over more of the globe, in addition to the roughly 130 nations in which U.S. troops are already deployed.

More specifically, they argue that we need permanent military bases in the Middle East, in Southeast Europe, in Latin America and in Southeast Asia, where no such bases now exist.

This was in 2002. But now it seems that when the bases are mentioned they are mentioned in an abstract manner - as an ideological imperative, rather than as a very basic part of US foreign policy. That is not the case with this article in the London Review of Books by Jim Holt (h/t Sullivan). It begins:

Iraq is ‘unwinnable’, a ‘quagmire’, a ‘fiasco’: so goes the received opinion. But there is good reason to think that, from the Bush-Cheney perspective, it is none of these things. Indeed, the US may be ‘stuck’ precisely where Bush et al want it to be, which is why there is no ‘exit strategy’.

Holt places the base in the context of US foreign policy. It actually didn't seem like earth shattering analysis. It just seemed like a statement of reality. Which is what so frustrating. If it is actually so obvious why is it not the context in which Iraq is analyzed in most of the media? Or maybe it is not so obvious. In any case go read it.

Leave us alone

Robert Farley at Lawyers, Guns and Money has a review of Hitchens' attempts at self justification. The post itself is well worth reading, especially if you had the misfortune of reading Hitchens' article. In addition this comment by Davis X. Machina in the comments section was especially apt.

Far too many people with megaphones all shouting stage directions at people who are just living their lives, thank you very much, and don't want to be actors in someone else's world-historical documentary.

Sullivan's Washington Quote

Andrew Sullivan has a quote on his website which seems to be an exhortation to treat prisoners decently. It seems spot on. What any decent general would say about the treatment of prisoners - and we know that Washington was a stickler about prisoners. But there are ellipses in the quote and no sourcing. Which worried me so I googled it and it turns out that back in February Never in Our Name had seen the same quote and tracked the original down. You should read his post but to summarize - the quote is from the charge George Washington gave to Benerdict Arnold when he was ordering him to march into Quebec. Here is the relevant part of the quote without editing

Should any American Soldier be so base and infamous as to injure any Canadian or Indian, in his Person or Property, I do most earnestly enjoin you to bring him to such severe and exemplary Punishment as the Enormity of the Crime may require. Should it extend to Death itself it will not be disproportional to its Guilt at such a Time and in such a Cause

So, it is not exactly about prisoners. But as NION puts it "Go back and read those orders again - this time substituting "Iraq" for "Canada" and "Iraqis" for "Canadians and Indians."" and perhaps it is even more relevant, because the Canadians and Indians Washington refers to "would simply be citizens living in their own land, who just happened to be caught in the middle of a conflict between America and some tyrant."

Whither Pakistan

I had originally intended to write this the new media way - chock full of links to corroborating sources. But it has been sitting in draft for so long that I am afraid that by the time I do that Pakistan will have already gone wherever it is going. With the recent imposition of Martial law I suppose I should update this post. But I am too lazy to do it and I don't think my fundamental take has changed. And anyway I don't think either of the two people who read the intermittent outputs of this blog will mind. To any third person who might wander and actually suffer through this in I hope you will excuse the rambling sloppy nature of my writing.

A common misconception is that democracy empowers people. In truth, empowerment is not a result of democracy, democracy is the reflection of empowerment. Governments reflect power balances in society, and if people either collectively or individually have power this is generally reflected in some form of democracy. The reflection of power in the form of democracy is best illustrated by that oldest (with apologies to Iceland) of democracies, Britain. In Britain from 1780 when less than 3% of the population could vote to universal suffrage in 1918 the power of the vote closely followed economic power. From the rule under Henry VI that in order to vote you had to possess land worth 40 shillings to 1884 when to vote you had to be a male house owner the right to vote was explicitly tied to economic power. And what does that have to do with Pakistan and its future? This, that when we talk about democracy in Pakistan we should not confuse it with democracy in Sweden. Or if we do it should be in terms of understanding that just as in Sweden democracy reflects the power balance so in Pakistan will democracy reflect the power balance. Just that in Sweden the average voter due to their economic clout may actually possess some power while in Pakistan, for the same reason, the average voter will possess very little. The political structure will reflect the accommodations and conflicts of the power centers in the country.

Power exists in a number of different ways. The two principal ways are through the ownership of resources, and through organization. Labor unions may not own resources but if they are well organized they can exert power. And it is clear that ownership of resources - money, land, - usually goes hand in hand with power. In Pakistan there have been two groups that have had power through most of its history, the moneyed classes (feudal landlords and "industrialists") through their ownership of resources and the military through its organization.

Things seemed to be changing in the late 60's as a newly emerging middle class in the cities distinct from the landlords started demanding a share of the power. Actual political parties with actual mass participation began to appear. One of them was the Pakistan Peoples Party led by Bhutto the father of Benazir and very much a member of the power elite. Despite his wealthy (very wealthy) background Bhutto actually was a real honest to goodness populist politician, and was soon immensely popular in what was then West Pakistan. He campaigned under the slogan "Islam is our faith, democracy is our policy, socialism is our economy. All power to the people." After he came to power he, more or less, tried to keep his promises, and embarked on a policy of economic redistribution involving nationalization of industrial sectors and banks. He set up a policy of low interest loans to farmers and small business and there was a push to increase exports. One can argue over the long term viability of his economic policies but at least initially they led to an increase in the size of the middle class.

A bit off the subject but relevant nonetheless, in the late sixties in Pakistan there was also a developing (reviving?) communist movement which had come into its own after a split with the Soviets after the 1965 war with India. I hesitate to call them Maoist because that label brings to mind the Naxalites in India and the Shining Path in Peru and perhaps the PKK in Turkey. These guys were Maoist in the sense that they believed that the peasants were the vanguard of the "revolution." They had some success in the NWFP, actually setting up a liberated zone in an area called Hashtnagar in the early seventies. The army tried to break them but, in a scenario repeated lately in Waziristan, were not able to quell them and a de-facto "liberated zone" existed for quite a while (I am not sure about its status now). After Bhutto took power the communist advance was stopped cold. Wherever the communists had succeeded in getting the peasantry organized a government minister would show up and sign over land deeds to them. End of revolution. Bhutto used to boast that during his tenure he had not killed a single communist and they had not gained an inch.

Bhutto had the misfortune of ruling during a period of global inflation. As the price of food went up so did the temperature of the populace. Also there was the matter of the nuclear program which did not endear him to the US. And then, in what seems to have been a favorite activity of all megalomaniacal leaders, Bhutto engaged in vote rigging to guarantee an election he would most likely have won anyway (shades of CREEP) and lost more popular support. With the tacit approval of the US the military took power and thus began the long dark period of Zia. I don't know how long Zia would have lasted. The increase in the size of the middle class had resulted in a demand for more power from the people and the military in Pakistan, unlike the military in say Burma, is not separate from the people. In time, it was possible that there would have been a movement towards democracy.

But it was not to be. Fortune smiled on Zia, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and Brezinski saw an opportunity to bleed the Soviets. Money poured into Pakistan from the US directly and through Saudi Arabia. The drug lords of Afghanistan moved to Pakistan and drug money (along with drugs) also appeared in large amounts, bringing a phenomenal rise in drug addiction and an increase in corruption. Much of this money was funneled to religious groups which were best positioned to recruit the fodder required for the bleeding of the Soviets. And thus arose a third power center in Pakistan, what for the want of a better word we will call the jihadis. Initially they were under the control of the military, and the military made use of them in a number of different ways. The fodder went to fight and die in Afghanistan. The money also went to empower the military resulting in a vast expansion of military owned businesses. And the money benefitted and enhanced the power of those in the military most closely tied to the bleeding operation giving them an added incentive to keeping the jihadi operations alive. After the Soviets folded the military used the jihadis to acquire "strategic depth" in Afghanistan by training and backing the Taliban. In Kashmir the military tried to use the Brezinski strategy against India. However, it was becoming clear by the end of the millenium that the jihadis were on their way to becoming a power center in their own right. In 1999 in the seesaw between the two established power centers the military again took power in the person of Musharraf. Early in his tenure Musharraf had recognized the problem posed by the Jihadis but was thrashing about for a solution.

And then came 9/11 and the supposed U turn of the Musharraf regime. At first glance it seems that this was the perfect opportunity to get rid of the jihadi problem. And so Musharraf seems to have thought. With 9/11 a true shock to the conscience the support for jihadis from the non-militant religious segment of the population had been dealt a severe blow. The US was providing financial support which used properly could cut the ground out from under the jihadis in their centers of power. I have written earlier about one Musharraf attempt to do so which foundered on the rock of the arrogant stupidity of a Republican congressional staffer. Another was informal discussions between the military and groups in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas to regularize the status of FATA - treating them like any other part of Pakistan and including them in the distribution of resources. Whatever the wisdom of these actions and whoever is to blame for thwarting them they were not successful in eliminating the Jihadi power. This year the Jihadis felt comfortable enough in their power to openly challenge the government - first in Swat and parts of NWFP and finally in the capital Islamabad itself. At the same time the old enemy inflation was increasing the frustration level of the populace. Economic development has increased the rich poor divide. Some of this frustration was vented in the Chief Justice incident.

Which brings us to today. The military has provided reasonably efficient government for a while. But the economic development has not been enough to get them strong support and in any case it has been uneven, increasing the rich/poor divide. If the military is to win against the jihadi challenge they need allies. And the only available allies are the wealthy and the political parties which represent them. Among them the PPP is the most reasonable choice. Its leader is one with whom Musharraf does not have a personal vendetta. It is reasonably popular and would provide the legitimacy the military needs to operate in todays globalized information society. The next step will probably be an agreement between the military and the PPP where the PPP, after winning the parliamentary elections leads the country into "democracy" while preserving the perquisites of the military. The military then settles down to the task of getting rid of the jihadis. Whether they will succeed will depend on how well the PPP can govern and whether they can provide some measure of economic and social relief to the populace and whether the military can subdue the jihadis without arousing nationalist sentiments in the NWFP and Baluchistan. In order to keep the public on its side the Military-PPP alliance will have to do something to alleviate the economic stress on the people. Rising inflation in Pakistan will severely hamper their efforts. In the best of worlds improving the economic condition of the people will lead to conditions where with more economic clout the people of Pakistan will be able to demand and get a voice in their governance - democracy as we know it. In the real world such a transformation requires leadership of a caliber that I don't see in Pakistan today. So the prospects are not that great.

On the international front one of Musharraf's contributions has been a gradual de-emphasis on the Kashmir issue. If this emotionally charged issue is taken off the table then given the globalization trends one would normally expect a gradual normalization and increasing trade with India. However, there is an axis developing with India and US on one side and China and Russia on the other. If Pakistan tilts towards China which has been close to Pakistan through fair times and foul it is not clear how far normalization can go.

They say trying times call out great leaders. They are clearly wrong. In these trying times when the future of the planet itself (in terms of its human population) is in jeopardy we have Bush. And Pakistan has Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto. But we go through history with the leaders we have not the leaders we want.

Whither Musharraff

Right after Musharraf took power I remember reading someone's opinion that Musharraf was a brilliant tactician and a lousy strategist. The writer was using the Kargil affair as an example when Kashmiri jihadis backed by Pakistani paramilitary forces took over high points on the Indian side of the Line of Control in Kashmir. The move was arguably brilliant from a tactical point of view and absolutely disastrous strategically. We have seen some the strategist Musharraf and his bungling for a while. Recently, the tactician has come to fore. And whatever you think of the outcome it is hard not to feel some respect for the tactician.

Starting on March 9th with the attempt to fire the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and continuing with the May 12th killings of protesters by thugs from a party aligned to him it seemed that Musharraf's career was rapidly spiraling down the toilet. The leaders of both the major parties Sharif and Bhutto were flexing their muscle. The supreme court had clearly shown that it could not be relied on to rubber stamp the government's decision, and the extremists had declared war and were succesfully resisting the army. Now, even though Musharraf's plan can still easily go awry: there are several petitions before the supreme court challenging the legality of Musharraf's candidacy, Musharraf's position is substantially better than anyone could have predicted just a few weeks ago.

He has neutralized the political opposition by first cutting a deal with the more powerful of his two opponents Benazir Bhutto, and then obtaining US backing to sideline Sharif. (The trigger for the latter was pulled by the Saudis but the Saudis are not known for making such publicly intrusive moves without US - dare I say it- instruction). The manner in which Sharif was sidelined was in itself a demonstration of Musharraf's ability to gauge the mood of the public.
Sharif had not been a popular politician when he was overthrown by Musharraf, therefore, it was easy to control any possible public demonstrations. Most of the leadership of his party who could have organized demonstrations were arrested prior to his arrival. This, by itself, would not have stopped popular demonstrations if Sharif had been - well - popular. But he was not and his re-exile only served to emphasize this fact, and in some sense de-legitimize not only his posturing as the champion of democracy but the idea of democracy in Pakistan itself. If it had been Benazir Bhutto who had been coming back the situation probably would have been much different. Her party, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) comes close as any party in Pakistan to being a political party. But, Benazir Bhutto's priorities did not include a people power revolution. For her Musharraf used a different lever - the various corruption cases against her. And today the Government ofPakistan has announced that the corruption cases against Ms. Bhutto have been dropped. This now accomplishes two things. Her support for Musharraf during next weeks election and nullification of her status as a champion for democracy.

It seems for now, barring some unforeseen action by the Supreme Court Musharraf will continue as the President of Pakistan. And what does that mean for democracy in Pakistan. Unfortunately very little. More on this later

One of the more disgusting acts of the US senate was the Military Commissions Act of 2006 which amongst its other provisions included a denial of habeas corpus rights - a step back into the earlier part of the last millennium. Today the senate is debating Amendment S.2202 which would restore habeas corpus rights. Please call your senator now and ask them to support this ammendment.

More information here.

Riverbend is back.

She is now posting from Syria.

Gul Again

It seems Gul is to be the sole AKP candidate for President - and hence the next President of the Republic of Turkey. A week ago this had not seemed the most likely outcome. In the first abortive round the story is that Gul had not been the initial candidate suggested by Erdogan. Erdogan had agreed on two compromise candidates acceptable to the military and other secularist forces. However, Bulent Arinc, the speaker of parliament and a prominent member of the conservative wing of the party had balked suggesting that if Erdogan himself was not going to stand for the presidency the party should nominate either Gul or himself. In the event Gul was nominated leading in the end to the new elections. For these elections Erdogan had brought about a significant reorientation of the AKP parliamentary cadre and a number of moderate women and other mildly left of center politicians were elected on the AKP list. It was assumed that this meant a weakening of the conservatives within the party and because of that the nominee of the AKP for president would be a compromise candidate. Erdogan himself seemed to give support to this view suggesting that the AKP was looking for compromise. Then he backed off and suggested that the AKP would put forward multiple candidates who would campaign for votes from the opposition. In the end it seems the conservatives would not settle for anything but total victory and today the party executive committee with the support of Erdogan nominated Gul as the sole nominee of the party. Given the current numbers in Parliament, and an earlier promise by the nationalist MHP not to boycott the presidential election, this means that Gul will be the 11th president of Turkey.

I don't know how well Gul will do as president but all in all I don't think this was a good result. Firstly, with the same party controlling both Parliament and the Presidency the election of a partisan reduces checks on the government. And we have all seen in the last six years how well that works. Second, it means that AKP is still an ideological party, or at least the ideological forces are the dominant force within the party, which is a dangerous sign for a party that so thoroughly dominates the political scene. Finally, while Erdogan made no explicit commitments he certainly dropped enough hints both before and after the elections that he would be looking for compromise. Now, that he has in some sense gone back on his words, he loses some of his stature and his ability to work with the opposition suffers. Turkey faces some tough times ahead - not the least because of Iraq - and she will need the different forces within the parliament to pull together.

A day late...

Brian Ulrich at American Footprints links to an article in the Christian Science Monitor about a proposed US campaign to win hearts and minds in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan. (The campaign had been reported on earlier as well). I had posted something on this in the comment section at Newshoggers which got butchered by haloscan. Here is a slightly updated version of that post.

Musharraf also saw the danger from the federally administered tribal areas (FATA) early on and the necessity for a hearts and minds campaign in the FATA. This is from a 2003 article from the New Yorker:

The Pakistani government has tried to advance this argument in Washington, encouraging a less confrontational strategy in the tribal regions. In December, 2001, according to several knowledgeable sources, Musharraf met with Wendy Chamberlin, then the American Ambassador to Pakistan, and asked for American support in helping him extend his control over the tribal areas. He argued that, unless the borders were cauterized there, the flow of fighters from Afghanistan would be impossible to stop. Musharraf told Chamberlin that the local Pashtun people could be bought off with basic government services that their tribal leaders had never provided—such as schools, clinics, roads, and water. Large cash awards could be offered to locals who helped track down fugitive Arabs.

“How much do you need?” Chamberlin asked. Musharraf’s answer was forty million dollars.

Chamberlin told Musharraf that she would back his plan. But when her funding request reached Congress, it was derailed. Charlie Flickner, the powerful Republican clerk of the foreign-operations subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, felt that the expenditure was a waste of money . He had travelled to western Pakistan, and concluded that the tribal areas were essentially sinkholes. On his recommendation, Chamberlin’s proposal was rejected. Instead, the committee agreed to give fourteen million dollars to the tribal areas, in the form of law-enforcement assistance to the local constabularies.

“It’s not something you throw money at,” Flickner told me. “It’s the typical thing that the bureaucrats in Islamabad think of. I don’t think everything in the world is susceptible to American money.” Members of the Democratic minority on the committee refused to respond to questions on the record. One Democrat, however, told me, “We blew it. There was a window of opportunity, but we lost it by not funding them adequately.” Soon after Chamberlin’s proposal was dismissed, the North-West Frontier Province fell into the hands of Musharraf’s Islamist opponents; in the tribal areas, fundamentalists further expanded their influence. (emphasis mine)

Musharraf also tried to get the US to fund a campaign against the Madrassas.
He got an agreement from Bush who then reneged.


Commenting on a different report with similar components Brian said:

In Pakistan, by contrast, the influence of tribal leaders has seen a sharp decline for perhaps a decade, with the balance tilting toward religious leaders linked to the Taliban movement. ... I'm skeptical that these tribal leaders can really make a comeback against the religious movement which operates under the general "Taliban" label,

I agree with the general thrust of Brian's comments. The nature of the political landscape has been changing since 2001. And what stood a good chance of working in 2001 may not be feasible any more. Even as late as 2003 there were tribal leaders in FATA talking with the generals about "regularizing" the status of FATA and removing it from, what the tribal leaders saw as, the tyranny of the political agents. The impotence of the tribal leaders was a significant part of the attraction of the jihadis. It makes one heartsick to see the record of wasted opportunities and because of them the lives that have been wasted and will continue to be wasted.

Turkish Elections and the Kurds

Updated Below

The possibility of an incursion by the Turkish military depends to some extent on the internal politics of Turkey. From this perspective, if you see incursion as a negative, there are several encouraging signs .

Firstly, there is the victory of the governing party, the AK party, in Kurdish regions against candidates of the Kurdish DTP party. In fact the early indications are that the ruling party won the majority (about 52%) of the Kurdish votes. Of course the candidates from AK are also of Kurdish origin, but then there have always been Kurdish politicians in all parties - and if you include those of mixed Kurdish-Turkish heritage they probably make up a significant proportion of the politicians. As opposed to these "mainstream" parties which are defined by their generic ideological and policy positions the DTP is identified as a Kurdish party mainly concerned with Kurdish cultural and political rights. In the 2002 elections the DTP failed to get into parliament because of a 10% threshold requirement for parties to get into parliament. Some argued at that time that their loss (they got about 5% of the vote) showed that the "Kurdish issue" was really more of a Southeastern issue - one of poverty and underdevelopment in the Southeast - than an ethnic issue. However, many felt that because of distortions due to the threshold no valid conclusions could be drawn. To get around the threshold requirement this time around the DTP members contested the election as independents. They won 23 seats but they lost in many places to AK. This has had two effects. One was the demonstration of an acceptance by the Kurdish electorate of the southeast that the AK, a national "mainstream" party, could represent their interests. The other was the recognition by the DTP that narrow "ethnic" issues would no longer be sufficient to guarantee them support in the southeast. This is evident from their post election statements in which the newly elected DTP parliamentarians promise to pursue a more accommodating approach and focus on issues of economics and development for the region rather than on cultural issues. This is a far cry from the last time a Kurdish party was in parliament when symbolic actions took precedence. The DTP is not giving up cultural issues just changing their focus. In the long term both of these outcomes bode well for the stability of the region. If we have the luxury of thinking in the long term.

In terms of the short term both these factors have considerably strengthened the non-interventionist forces within the AK. The increased strength of the AK in the southeast also means an increased sensitivity to the southeast where intervention would not be welcomed. Furthermore, a "reasonable" DTP would be able to provide support to the AK in these matters. Finally, the impressive showing by the AK in the elections, even if they did not increase their number of seats in parliament, gives them a much more powerful voice than they had before. Given this, barring a preemptive move by the interventionist forces within the military and their political supporters, the AK has a breathing space. Reports were that Condi has promised action on the PKK to the Turkish government if they would just give her some time. There is time now for those actions. Under different circumstances I would be feeling very optimistic right now. But after seeing the incompetence of the last six years I fear that we will let this opportunity pass. I hope I am wrong.

Update:

Turkish newspapers are playing up the column in the July 30th issue of the Washington Post by Robert Novak. He had this to report about the US response to Turkish requests for action against the PKK

The surprising answer was given in secret briefings on Capitol Hill last week by Eric S. Edelman, a former aide to Vice President Cheney who is now undersecretary of defense for policy. Edelman, a Foreign Service officer who once was U.S. ambassador to Turkey, revealed to lawmakers plans for a covert operation of U.S. Special Forces to help the Turks neutralize the PKK. They would behead the guerrilla organization by helping Turkey get rid of PKK leaders that they have targeted for years.

Given the neocon credentials of Edelman and the standard neocon approach to problems (what would Jack Bauer do?), the report seems credible. Whether, this approach can be successful depends on if there is substantial buy-in from the Kurdistan Regional Government (also known as the Talabani and Barzani clans). Even then I would rate the chances of operational success low. However, on a PR front, even a failed attempt can only help the perception of the US in Turkey.

Turkish elections

In response to Cernig's post

Just to add some context, the percentage of votes garnered by AK is the largest share of votes garnered by any party in [modern] Turkish electoral history. AK has run a very sophisticated campaign populating its lists with non-islamist women and mildly left-of-center politicians.

And you are right about the agreement between all parties and the military about the PKK. The memories of the 90's in fresh in many peoples minds when thousands died in the conflict between the PKK and the military. Most separatist movements tend to employ some degree of violence but the PKK was (and probably still is) a truly vicious organization.

While any incursion by the Turks into Northern Iraq is problematic this one could be particularly bad because I get the feeling that the Turkish military will not be content with only focusing on the PKK. They have already asked for rules of engagement from the government with the clear implication that they would not be upset if the Kurdish Regional Government was to be a possible target. I am afraid if they go in it will not simply be in hot pursuit of the PKK. I am not sure what Petraeus will do under those circumstances. He has not been particularly fond of the Turks in the past.

Pakistan SC decision

Reacting to the Pakistani Supreme Courts dismissal of the charges against the Chief Justice, Cernig notes that

The Pakistani Supreme Court has dealt a major blow to Musharaff's credibility, which he has been forced to swallow because he has insufficient political capital left to chance ignoring it.

and says that

The short version of what comes next - Musharaff is toast. Assailed by both sides, from pro-democracy critics and from once-supportive Islamists, his days are numbered.

I disagree with Cernig on this as I have previously on things Musharraf (though this time with less conviction than before) but I think the Supreme Court decision is the best of the many bad possibilities facing Musharraf. He and Pakistan are facing a major war, something he has avoided for the last five years, and he needed to clear the decks. The Chief Justice affair has been a running sore since March 9, and had to be concluded. He has tried various ways to somehow conclude the affair including the bloody attack by the MQM thugs on May 12. Nothing had worked for him and there were not many realistic options left. This decision by the Supreme Court has to have come as a relief. Cernig could be right about his being toast but I think it is much more likely that his future will depend on the success or failure of his campaign against the jihadis. Of course if the US tries another of their useless predator attacks or even worse follows the neocon position of "targeted raids," the chances of his survival go down considerably. Which does not contradict my earlier position, because if the US intervenes militarily the fight against the jihadis will most likely be lost.

Video compilation

Via Andrew Sullivan here is an interesting video compilation.

And here is another.

Targeted attacks

Eric Martin at American Footprints links to a Kevin Drum comment on a Washington Post editorial recommending "targeted strikes" in the tribal areas of Pakistan.
I would view with great skepticism any claims that US intelligence has enough information to allow for "targeted strikes." The US did not have independent assets on the ground before 9/11. I remember a quote from a US intelligence operative about why they didn't have any agents within (or even remotely close to) Al Qaeda - something on the order of who wants to spend years sleeping on the ground eating crappy food with no women around. Which, among other things, said a whole lot about the professionalism of the current crop of intelligence professionals. The lack of inside information, even at the lowest level, contributed to the debacle at Tora Bora and has bedeviled all efforts at getting at Bin Laden and Zawahiri. As might be expected the situation has not improved since 9/11. While I am sure the US has excellent technical capabilities planning "targetted" strikes requires good human intelligence. The times when the US has used its predators to attack places where supposedly Zawahiri had a lunch date has only resulted in "collateral damage." The actions while killing many possibly innocent people also humiliated the Pakistanis, who had to rush in to unconvincingly claim "credit," and strengthened the jihadis by giving them a propaganda coup and highlighting the impotence of the Musharraf government vis-a-vis the US.

Blake Hounshell is right on the mark when he refers to the mandate that Musharraf has to go after the jihadis. There is a large segment of the Pakistan populace which is sick and tired of the jihadis and their antics. The Chief Justice issue has been a major diversion for Musharraf. The western press is calling the resolution of this issue with the decision of the Supreme Court against Musharraf a blow to Musharraf. I think Musharraf is probably breathing a sigh of relief as this is the least bad of the many bad options that Musharraf was facing. It is also a wake up call to him and his allies that their time is not unlimited. I think Musharraf is better positioned now to go after the jihadis than he has ever been and for the US to stick an oar in at this stage would be, as Hounshell points out, a propaganda bonanza for Al Qaeda. I would go even further. The Pakistanis are cooperating with the US because it is in their interest to cooperate. If we make it not in their interest to cooperate we will encourage them to look for alternative courses of action. None of which, I think, will be in the long term interest of the US. I am not as pessimistic as Eric is about possible US actions. We still have reasonably knowledgeable people in the government dealing with Pakistan and hopefully they will not do anything stupid.